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BROWNS TO BALTIMORE: FRANCHISE
FREE AGENCY AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE NFL
SANJAY JOSE' MULLICK*
I. LEAGUE THINK
"We're a group of 28 fat-cat Republicans
who vote socialist on football."
- Art Modell
Owner, Cleveland Browns (former)1
In 1961, when the National Football League (hereinafter "NFL")
convened for its owners meeting, it was prepared to endorse a new way
of thinking that would change the face of the League, chart the course
for the League's future and set an example for all professional sports.2
The NFL's new Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, convinced its founding
families, including the Rooneys, Maras and Halases, to cede control of
the television broadcast of their teams' games to the League itself. No
longer would each team owner negotiate his own separate television
contract; rather, the NFL would sell each team's television rights to the
networks as a single package. The total revenues generated by these
contracts would then be shared equally among every franchise.3
This ideology of collectivism came to be known as "League Think."'4
Rozelle argued that all the owners, from large or small markets or strong
or weak teams, should join together and act in concert. With a unified
purpose, it would be to the benefit of all teams. Pooling resources and
sharing revenue would stabilize the competitive balance. By preserving
the viability of the League as a whole, its product would be more mar-
ketable over the long term and, thus, increase the profits of each owner
individually. In just three years, this policy increased television revenue
* B.S.F.S. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1991; J.D. Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, 1996. The author would like to thank Professor Richard Alan Gordon for
his inspiration and support. The author dedicates this article to his brother, with whom he
shares a love of sports.
1. Mr. Modell's team moved to Baltimore and is now known as the Ravens. John Helyar,
Leaguethink Links NFL Old Guarders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at B10.
2. See DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RIFSE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 14 (1986).
3. Id
4. Id at 13.
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tenfold per team.' Success earned the ultimate confidence of the own-
ers; they put the interests of the League ahead of their own.
Today, League Think is under all-out assault. "All for one and one
for all," the dominant philosophy of the NFL for over a generation, is
now being questioned.6 Unlike 1961, when a team could be purchased
for a few million dollars, the same $4 million used to buy the Cleveland
Browns that year7 could not even buy a three-minute commercial in last
year's Super Bowl.8 Today, professional football is a multi-billion dollar
industry, with individual franchises worth over one hundred million dol-
lars. 9 Both the increased cost and profit of the sport have intensified
competition for the dollar. This pits League members against each
other, as New Guard owners challenge the ways of the League's found-
ing families.10 It calls into question the operating concepts upon which
the NFL owes its modern existence. And it even shakes the foundation
of the notion of a league, as individual team owners now seemingly take
matters into their own hands.
This article will identify the forces which have given rise to the de-
cline of "League Think" and examine the impact these forces have on
the National Football League. Principally, this article examines the de-
cline through the lens of "franchise free agency,"" the recent trend to-
wards team relocations, since this issue best embodies the various forces
at play that pose the most serious challenge to the NFL as we know it.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Ma at 16.
7. Art Modell bought the Cleveland Browns in 1961 for $3.9 million. Michael
Abramowitz, A Few Determined Men Made Stadium Dreams Come True, WASH. POsr, Apr.
14,1996, at A19.
8. See Helyar, supra note 1, at B10.
9. As of the end of the 1994 season, the average NFL franchise was worth $160 million.
See Michael K. Ozanian, Suite Deals: Inside the New Stadium Boom, FIN. WORLD, May 9,
1995, at 50.
10. Cowboys owner, Jerry Jones, contends, for example, that owners having to pay his
amount of debt service (he paid $140 million for the Cowboys in 1989) cannot afford to en-
gage in a completely equal revenue sharing program with owners who bought their teams
decades ago for relatively next to nothing. See Roger Thurow, Line of Scrimmage: Jerry Jones
Thinks NFL Revenue Sharing is a Bit Socialistic, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at Al, A8. See
also Helyar, supra note 1.
11. This term was coined by former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle and is ostensibly
derived from "free agent," the term used in sports to describe a player who is free to offer his
services to the bidder of his choice because he is no longer under complete contractual obliga-
tion to his current or previous team. See Legislative and Oversight Hearings on Professional
Sports Franchise Relocation Antitrust Implications, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary
(statement of NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue) 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1996) [hereinafter
Commissioner].
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Part II surveys the most recent, ongoing, and prospective franchise
relocations, with special emphasis on the Cleveland Browns move to
Baltimore. Part III assesses the merit of the NFL's contention that anti-
trust law renders it powerless to stop franchise free agency and argues
that granting the NFL a limited antitrust exemption is bad policy be-
cause the NFL actually chooses not to challenge franchise relocations.
Part IV explores the "New Economics" which have arisen in the NFL
over the last three years and argues that the root cause of franchise free
agency is the owners' intensified pursuit of cash from those revenue
streams which are unshared, particularly that from stadiums. Part V
breaks down the principal elements of the relocation deal reached be-
tween the NFL and the City of Cleveland in the wake of the team's sur-
prise move. Beyond this particular situation, it is unworkable policy
whose terms set a dangerous precedent because they go against the own-
ers' inherent self-interest. Part VI discusses potential reforms that can
be undertaken to alleviate this situation and reviews legislative efforts
which are currently underway. However, it posits that the only effective
reform will be one which is either initiated by the NFL or that anchors
itself in the realities of the current professional football marketplace. Fi-
nally, it presents a three-part plan which makes creative use of the 1961
Sports Broadcast Antitrust Act and a once-proposed Sports Franchise
Arbitration Board.'2 This plan makes three recommendations to solve
the problems which plague the fundamental structure of professional
football and are at the core of the trend towards franchise free agency: 1)
neutralize venue, 2) change the nature of ownership, and 3) incentivize
expansion. Part VII looks to the future of the NFL and concludes that
the League must either expeditiously initiate policy reforms that recog-
nize the new economic realities of the NFL, or acknowledge that, as
teams now seek to act in their own individual interest first, that the era
of League Think is over.
This article makes two overriding assumptions in conducting this
analysis: 1) the presence of a professional football franchise results in net
economic and/or cultural value to the city in which it resides13 and 2) a
professional football team does have a responsibility of loyalty to its
community.
12. See Sports Antitrust Broadcast Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1995).
13. Cultural value relates to the notion that having a sports franchise adds to the city's
prestige and provides civic pride. For a thorough discussion of the question of whether a
sports team adds overall value to a city, see CRLE ~s C. EUc-NER, PLAYING THE FIELD ch. 3
(1993).
1996]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
II. ON =H- MovE
"We've turned into the National Floating League."
- Ralph Wilson
Owner, Buffalo Bills 14
The NFL's 1996 annual winter meeting was held at the Breakers Ho-
tel. 15 Owners peered out at the ocean view off Palm Beach, an appropri-
ate metaphor for the recent fluidity in the League. In the previous year,
three teams relocated to other cities, one will be relocating and another
is serious about its intention to do the same. This wave does not even
count the handful of teams which have recently reached new stadium
agreements in their current cities amid threats to relocate.
The first move of this series occurred in May 1995, when the Los
Angeles Rams moved to St. Louis. St. Louis had been without an NFL
team since 1988 (when its Cardinals moved to Phoenix) and had been
passed over in 1993, when the NFL chose Charlotte and Jacksonville as
expansion sites. To lure the Rams, St. Louis agreed to pay the Rams $15
million for team relocation costs and $30 million to pay off the debt the
team owed the City of Anaheim, and place the finishing touches on what
would be the team's new home, the brand new $260 million Trans World
Dome.16 Nevertheless, the Rams left Anaheim Stadium, a facility built
to lure the Rams out of the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum in 1980.17
In November 1995, the Los Angeles Raiders left the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum in order to move to Oakland.18 The Raiders origi-
nally left Oakland for Los Angeles when the Rams left Los Angeles for
Anaheim. Now, the Rams had left Anaheim for St. Louis and the Raid-
ers had left Los Angeles to return to Oakland, leaving both Anaheim
and Los Angeles without a team. In addition, the Houston Oilers will be
moving from Houston to Nashville, 19 and the owner of the Seattle
Seahawks wants to move from Seattle to Los Angeles.2 °
14. Jim Armstrong, NFL's Storm Clouds Won't Go Away: Team Relocation Remains Hot
Issue, DENY. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at C22.
15. Leonard Shapiro, NFL Owners Have Full Agenda, WASH. PoST, Mar. 11, 1996, at
0.
16. Footloose Football, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 90.
17. KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PURSUIT OF
SPORTS FRANCHISES, EvNrs, STADIUMS AND ARENAS 36 (1995).
18. Recent Moves, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1995, at D4.
19. On April 30, 1996 NFL owners voted 23 to 6 (with one abstention) to approve the
Oiler's move to Nashville. Leonard Shapiro, NFL Owners Approve Oilers Relocation, WASH.
POST, May 1, 1996, at B3.
20. Leonard Shapiro, Tagliabue Offers Cautionary Tale, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1996, at
[Vol. 7:1
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The move that sent shockwaves throughout all of professional sports,
however, occurred on November 6, 1995 when Art Modell stood with
Maryland Governor Parris Glendening at Camden Yards and announced
that Modell's Cleveland Browns were coming to Baltimore. Baltimore
would build the Browns a $200 million stadium for the 1998 season and
offer it to the team rent-free.21 Unlike those other departing teams that
had not always received fan support, the Browns were one of the NFL's
most storied franchises. They always played in front of sell-out crowds
at Cleveland Stadium and their famed "Dawg Pound" was one of the
most celebrated fan clubs in the NFL. Furthermore, Art Modell was no
neophyte or maverick owner; he represented the essence of the NFL
establishment. It was Modell who managed the NFL's sacrosanct shared
television contract for 31 years.' If Modell could abandon the credo of
League Think, nothing was sacred.
III. Ti ANTITRUST FALLACY
"It is not that leagues can't restrict team movement - it is that
they refuse to - and they refuse to because it is clearly
against the owners' economic self-interest to do so."
- Representative Martin Hoke (R-OH)23
A. Raiders
The National Football League is an unincorporated association which
exists to promote and foster the business of its 30 professional football
team members.24 Any team action (including relocation) requires the
approval of three-fourths of the League membership.25
However, the NFL argues that it is powerless to stop teams from
moving since judicial decisions have applied antitrust law to professional
football franchise relocations. At a minimum, the League contends that
were it to lose a lawsuit trying to stop a move, it would risk having to pay
tens to hundreds of millions of dollars in treble damages to the relocat-
21. Athena Schaffer, NFL's Browns Begin Play In Baltimore Next Year, AMUSEMENT
Bus., Nov. 13, 1995, at 17.
22. Helyar, supra note 1.
23. Richard Sandomir, Tagliabue Summons No Support for Antitrust Exemption, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at Bl.
24. See NFL CONST. arts. 1.1, 2.1(a), 3.1(a) (1988).
25. Id. at art. 4.3, 5.6.
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ing team.26 The National Football League points to Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum Commission v. NFL 7 (hereinafter Raiders land II), which
is considered the seminal case on this matter. In two heralded rulings
that have been thoroughly analyzed, the courts essentially held that the
NFL's unanimous vote blocking Al Davis's proposed move of the Oak-
land Raiders to Los Angeles violated antitrust law as an unreasonable
restraint of trade.28 In that case, the NFL was held liable and had to
ultimately pay approximately $50 million as a result of its defeat.2 9 Con-
sequently, the League has been gun-shy about contesting franchise
moves.
30
B. Limited Antitrust Exemption
To protect itself from such destabilizing moves, the NFL has recently
reinvigorated its attempts to obtain a limited antitrust exemption from
Congress. The League contends that only with such an exemption can it
properly govern its teams, stabilize its product and protect itself from
blistering damage awards. 31 From a legal standpoint, the NFL's position
is that it is a unique business entity because it creates and markets a
single, jointly produced entertainment product, one which none of its
members could present on its own.32 In reliance on one another, it thus
contends that an internal decision of a sports league to prevent a
franchise relocation does not trigger a contract, combination or conspir-
acy under the Sherman Act because the teams are not independent eco-
nomic competitors.33 This is commonly referred to as the Single Entity
defense, one which has never prevailed in court with respect to profes-
26. The NFL had to pay the Raiders $50 million in the 1980s when it lost its suit to keep
the team from moving from Oakland to Los Angeles. See Commissioner, supra note 11, at 8-
11.
27. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (Raiders 1); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Oct 6, 1987) (Nos. 86-1968. 86-
1972) (Raiders 1).
28. The Raider's lease in Oakland had expired while the Brown's lease with Cleveland
had not. Ken Myers, Browns Case A Lesson in NFL Teamwork, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 19, 1996, at
Al, A21. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 17.
29. This sum is according to the NFL and includes legal fees. See Commissioner, supra
note 11, at 9.
30. Less than a month after the decision, the Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis and
did not even stop to ask for the League's permission. See Michael A. Cardozo & Jeffrey A.
Mishkin, Does a League Have the Right to Determine Where Teams Play?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 30,
1987, at 23-24.
31. See Commissioner, supra note 11, at 9.
32. Id. at 6, 8.
33. Id.
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sional football, but which continues to gain momentum and which is still
to be heard by the Supreme Court.34
C. Home Field Jury Advantage
Before Congress, the Commissioner often refers to his desire to elim-
inate "confusion" and "vagaries" in expressing the NFL's desire for Con-
gressionally-authorized immunity from the antitrust laws on matters of
franchise relocation.35 But understanding the issue from the dollars per-
spective helps facilitate the translation of the cryptic terms above. What
the Commissioner is actually concerned about, and appropriately so, is
that the NFL will never win an antitrust battle because these suits will
invariably be adjudicated in front of "home-town" juries 6.3  For example,
the Commissioner contends that after the League voted 21 to 3 to block
the Rams move,37 both the Rams and the Missouri Attorney General
threatened to seek billions in punitive damages, filing suit in St. Louis,
the city seeking the team. The NFL then voted 23 to 6, in favor of the
move.38 Among NFL oddsmakers the home field advantage is worth
three-and-a-half points; in a courtroom it can be worth hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.
D. On a Fee Day Owners Can See Forever
The NFL does not exactly come to the table with clean hands. It has
been suggested that the real reason the NFL relented and allowed the
Rams to move to St. Louis was because the Rams agreed to pay the NFL
a $71 million "relocation fee," a fact the Commissioner's testimony to
Congress does not include.39 The Raiders II court acknowledged that
expansion opportunities are the property of their respective league; the
NFL is thus justified in imposing an analogous charge on a moving team
when the value of the opportunity it is to receive exceeds the value of
34. See ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION ISSUE AND PUBLIC
POLICY RESPONSES, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT-. THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 231 (1985). See
Antitrust Issues in Relocation of Professional Sports Franchises: Hearings Before the Antitrust,
Bus. Rights and Competition Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. [hereinafter Hearings],
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-9 (1995) (statement of Prof. Gary R. Roberts, Tulane L. Sch.).
35. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 4.
36. See id. at 9.
37. Recent Moves, supra note 18.
38. Id.
39. The testimony recounts the State of Missouri's threats to sue the NFL and concludes
that "[a]s a result [as if exclusively], the membership eventually reversed its initial decision
and reluctantly voted to permit the Rams to move." See Commissioner, supra note 11, at 10
(emphasis added). Play Me in St. Louis, ECONOMIST, May 27, 1995, at 29.
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the opportunity it is returning to the League.40 But, unlike the Oakland
Raiders, the Rams were leaving Los Angeles, the number two television
market,41 and going to St. Louis, the number twenty television market.42
Unless the NFL is hinting that it considers stadium agreements indepen-
dently negotiated by teams to be League property, this circumstance
suggests that the Rams payment to the NFL involved more than just a
relocation fee. Although the League contends that the fee settlement
avoided a $2.5 billion lawsuit filed by the Missouri Attorney General,
the nature of this payment makes it just as logical to contend that owners
will let teams move if the reward for stepping aside is a few million dol-
lars all the way around.43
If the NFL is truly interested in eliminating the confusion over the
applicability of the antitrust laws to the League, then perhaps League
owners might let Congress know that it has received over $70 million
from the Rams that it can contribute to finding out. The Commissioner
asks Congress for an exemption, not because the NFL cannot win an
antitrust suit, but because the owners will not pay for one. However, it
should not be Congress's responsibility to provide insurance for the
NFL's quest for certainty over whether its own franchise relocation rules
will pass judicial muster. Congress need not seek further subsidies on
behalf of the 30-member $5 billion-plus NFL, a club whose exclusivity
and financial resources are second to none.'
E. Just Enforce the Rules
The decision in Raiders is often wielded by the League upon itself as
an antitrust club. But courts have not stated as a blanket rule that
leagues cannot block franchise relocations under antitrust law. Rather,
the court in Raiders was clear to point out that its ruling governed only
the NFL's decision as applied in that particular situation: "Accordingly,
we find that the Raiders' interpretation of the liability verdict is correct,
and thus construe the verdict to have held Rule 4.3 invalid only as it was
applied to the Raiders' proposed move to Los Angeles. '45
The Court actually encouraged the League to draft suitable criteria
for evaluating franchise relocation and, like a professor who gives away
40. See Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1373.
41. Recent Moves, supra note 18.
42. John Helyar, A Long Bomb: How Nashville Seeks, At High Cost, to Win Oilers From
Houston, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1995, at Al, A5.
43. Play Me in St. Louis, supra note 39.
44. See PHIL SCHAAF, SPoRTs MARKETING 84 (1995).
45. Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1369.
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an exam question by telling her students what material they "might"
want to pay special attention to, it basically told the NFL exactly what it
had to do to avoid antitrust liability in the future:
To withstand antitrust scrutiny, restrictions on team movement
should be more closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in
producing the NFL 'product' and competing with other forms of
entertainment. An express recognition and consideration of
those objective factors espoused by the NFL as important, such as
population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance etc.,
would be well advised. Fan loyalty and location continuity could
also be considered... Some sort of procedural mechanism to
ensure consideration of all the above factors may also be neces-
sary, including an opportunity for the team proposing the move to
present its case.46
The Appeals Court added:
Although this panel upheld the liability jury's conclusion that
Rule 4.3 as it was applied to the Raiders' move was an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade, the opinion noted several less onerous
forms of territorial restrictions that could pass muster under the
rule of reason. Among these were standards restricting team
movement that expressly recognized certain objective factors
such as population, economic projections and the like, that the
league could legitimately consider in deciding whether to permit a
team to move . .. such restrictions, applied in a non-arbitrary
manner, would be reasonable under the Sherman Act...47
Unlike before Raiders, the NFL has since taken the hint and now has
guidelines governing franchise relocation.48 They are substantively simi-
lar to the guidelines the court recommended to the NFL as safe from
antitrust liability. The Procedures for Proposed Franchise Relocations
require that any team proposing to move must furnish the Commissioner
with a Statement of Reasons.49 The Statement would include:
a comparison of the club's home revenues with League averages
and medians; past and projected ticket sales and other stadium
revenues at both the existing and proposed locations; and operat-
ing profits or losses during the most recent four seasons. The club
should also comment on any other factors it regards as relevant to
the League's consideration of the proposed transfer, including but
46. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1397 (citations omitted).
47. Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1373.
48. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PROCEDURES FOR PROPOSED FRANCHISE RELOCA-
TION (1984) [hereinafter Procedures]. The Procedures were adopted in 1984.
49. Id. at B.
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not limited to operations of other professional or college sports in
the existing and proposed home territories, and the effects of the
proposed transfer on NFL scheduling patterns, travel require-
ments, current divisional alignments, traditional rivalries, League-
wide television patterns and interests, the quality of stadium facil-
ities, and fan and public perceptions of the NFL and its member
clubs.50
The Statement must also be accompanied by certain information. A
copy of the team's existing contractual arrangements with its current sta-
dium must be included, such as the lease and concession, box suite and
advertising agreements.5 1 Also, a team must submit information such as
four years of audited team financial statements, a suitability assessment
of the team's current stadium, the costs and prospects of making desired
improvements to it, and the status of any efforts to negotiate such im-
provements with the relevant stadium authority.5 2
The League will review the information to determine "whether such
a move is justified and whether it is in the League's interest."53 The
factors it takes into account in considering a proposal to move are essen-
tially those of fan loyalty, team operating condition and stadium ade-
quacy. They read as follows:
1. The adequacy of the stadium in which the team played its
home games in the previous season, and the willingness of the
stadium or arena authority to remedy any deficiencies in such
facility;
2. The extent to which fan loyalty to and support for the team
has been demonstrated during the team's tenure in the existing
community;
3. The extent to which the team, directly or indirectly, received
public financial support by means of any publicly financed playing
facility, special tax treatment and any other form of public finan-
cial support;
4. The degree to which the ownership or management of the
team has contributed to any circumstance which might otherwise
demonstrate the need for such relocation;
5. Whether the team has incurred net operating losses, exclusive
of depreciation and amortization, sufficient to threaten the con-
tinued financial viability of the team;
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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6. The degree to which the team has engaged in good faith nego-
tiations with appropriate persons concerning terms and condi-
tions under which the team would continue to play its games in
such community or elsewhere within its current home territory;
7. Whether any other team in the League is located in the com-
munity in which the team is currently located;
8. Whether the team proposes to relocate to a community in
which no other team in the League is located; and
9. Whether the stadium authority, if public, is not opposed to
such relocation.5 4
It would seem that the obvious next step would be to assess the merit
of the moves by the Rams and Browns by critically analyzing how the
specific market conditions in Los Angeles and Cleveland measure up to
the League's guidelines for franchise relocation. But even with these
guidelines, the owners merely take ceremonial votes on proposed reloca-
tions and vote again to reverse their position. 5 Although provided am-
ple opportunity (especially when the Rams sought to move), the League
does not seek vigorous enforcement of these guidelines that the courts
suggested it establish and which it has drafted. It has been discovered
that the League concluded that the Browns did not meet the relocation
rules,56 yet, the League still allowed the team to move. If the owners do
not make full use of these guidelines, then attempting to analyze their
decisions through this criteria would be a misguided effort.
Instead, there must be something beyond antitrust law that explains
why owners do not oppose moves. There is - it's business.
IV. THE NEW ECONOMICS
"I put up more money than anyone has ever put up before
or since. I know how imaginative you can get when you wake
up in the morning with that kind of pressure on you."
- Jerry Jones
Owner, Dallas Cowboys57
54. Procedures, supra note 48, at C.
55. The owners originally voted 21-3 (with five abstentions) against the Rams move, but
then voted 23-6 in favor, after negotiating the relocation fee. Recent Moves, supra note 18.
56. A confidential internal NFL memo leaked to the press stated that although the NFL
believed Cleveland Stadium to be inadequate, that under the criteria of fan support and finan-
cial condition, the Browns situation did not qualify the team for relocation. See Around the
NFL, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 10, 1996, at B5.
57. William Rhoden, Cowboys' Owner Takes a Stand Against the NFL Welfare State, N.Y.
Titrms, Sept. 6, 1995, at B15.
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A. The Old Way - Revenue Sharing
The genesis of the modem NFL was the 1961 decision to pursue a
single television contract and distribute these dollars equally among all
teams.58 Financial parity bolstered the competitiveness of the League as
a whole and ignited what today is massive popularity, under even the
most conservative estimates. During this period, television revenues
have spiraled from $4.6 million to almost $4.5 billion59 and the market
value of franchises has rocketed from under $6 million to an average of
$160 million.60 It is said that as a league's television contract goes, so
goes the league - there is no arguing with these results.61
The National Football League has a comprehensive revenue sharing
system. As mentioned, all network television income is shared equally
among the thirty teams.62 Additionally, revenues from game ticket sales
are split sixty/forty, between the home and visiting team, respectively.63
Finally, revenue from the sale of NFL merchandise for all teams is
equally shared. As a result, upwards of ninety percent of all NFL reve-
nue is shared equally among all its 30 teamsr. 64 This parity has provided a
financial base for each team and, consequently, for the League as a
whole. It has also eliminated the extreme competitive inequities that
exist in sports without such extensive revenue sharing. In Major League
Baseball (hereinafter "MLB"), for example, the New York Yankees' $50
million unshared local television contract enables it to pay salaries more
than double that of some of the other teams in the MLB.65
58. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
59. The total 1994-1997 network television package is worth $4.4 billion, with $1.56 billion
coming from Fox. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 17, at 10.
60. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8. Ozanian, supra note 9, at 50.
61. EUCHNER, supra note 13, at 29.
62. The NFL Constitution reads in relevant part "All regular season (and pre-season net-
work) television income will be divided equally among all member clubs of the League re-
gardless of the source of such income." NFL CONST. art. 10.3. NFL teams do not have local
television contracts except for the broadcast of some of their preseason games.
63. The NFL defines this as Gross Receipts, meaning "all receipts from the sale of tickets,
including taxes and special charges but excluding ticket handling charges." Id. at art. 19.1.
The 40% is actually an option since visiting teams can instead choose to receive a guaranteed
$30,000. However, given that average gross receipts in the 1990s have been $1.5 million per
game, teams will undoubtedly choose the 40%. The 40% actually ends up being 34%, after
the home team's deduction of the 15% stadium rental allowance. See Alan J. Ostfield, Seat
License Revenue In The National Football League: Shareable or Not?, 5 SETON HALL J. OF
SPORTS L. 599, 604 (1995).
64. Id.
65. According to Financial World's 1995 franchise valuation survey, had the entire 1994
(strike-shortened) season been played, the Yankees would have paid $53.2 million in total
[Vol. 7:1
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B. 1993 - New Rules of the Game
But the rules of the game have changed. On May 6, 1993, the NFL
signed a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter "CBA")
with the National Football League Players Association (hereinafter
"NFLPA").66 The one flaw in the old revenue sharing system was that
by guaranteeing equality in the vast majority of revenues, the only way
for teams to pursue maximum profitability was to cut costs, namely
player salaries.67 Ironically, teams at times lost money by making it to
the Super Bowl because of the extra expenses associated with the ex-
tended travel arrangements and operation of facilities. Yet, at the same
time, it allowed owners with deep pockets to spend as much as they
wanted, inevitably drawing a disproportionate amount of talent to a se-
lect few teams.
The new CBA set out to change this. As a deterrent to having the
advent of player free agency turn into a bidding spree for the top avail-
able talent, the CBA set both a minimum and maximum League salary
amount; it came to be known as the "Salary Cap." The Salary Cap set
each team's total payroll at a fixed percentage of its equal share of the
League's revenues ("Defined Gross Revenues" minus "Benefits"). 6 As
player salaries while the Florida Marlins, Montreal Expos, San Diego Padres and Pittsburgh
Pirates would each have paid less than $25 million. See Ozanian, supra note 9, at 47.
66. The NFLPA is self-described as the exclusive bargaining representative of present and
future employee players in the NFL. NFL CoLLEcrivn BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000,
at Preamble [hereinafter CBA].
67. It remains a question, however, whether giving the home team the extra 10% in gross
receipts (rather than having a completely equal split) provides the incentive to field a suffi-
ciently competitive product. See Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball
Problem: Can Revenue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT L. 419, 433 (1995).
68. The CBA defines "Defined Gross Revenues" as:
(1) regular season, pre-season, and post-season gate receipts (net of admission taxes,
and surcharges paid to stadium or municipal authorities which are deducted for pur-
poses of calculating gate receipts subject to revenue sharing), including ticket revenue
from "luxury boxes," suites and premium seating subject to gate receipt sharing among
NFL Teams; and
(2) proceeds including Copyright Royalty Tribunal and extended market payments
from the sale, license or other conveyance of the right to broadcast or exhibit NFL pre-
season, regular season and play-off games on radio and television ... and all other
means of distribution, net of any reasonable and customary NFL expenses related to
the project; and
(3) proceeds from the sale or conveyance of any right to receive any of the revenues
described above.
The CBA defines "Benefits" as:
all sums paid (or to be paid on a proper accrual basis for a League year) by the NFL
and all NFL Teams, for, to or on behalf of present or former NFL players, but only for:
(items such as pension funding, group insurance programs, injury protection, workers'
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an example, in its first effective year, 1994, the fixed percentage was set
at 64% of Defined Gross Revenues, resulting in a Salary Cap of $34.6
million per team.69 This was designed to level the playing field among
teams by giving everyone the same resources. Additionally, player costs
would be stabilized by pegging payroll to the League's revenue drivers
(namely, its network television contract).
But the League's most profit-minded owners would not be deterred
by this enforced equality as long as they still had fingers left on which to
fit more Super Bowl rings. What they found was a glaring loophole in
the Salary Cap rules "big enough for a defensive lineman to bust
through. '70 Specifically, the amount of a signing bonus paid to a player
up-front did not fully count towards the Salary Cap in the year in which
it was paid; rather, it was prorated over the entire contract term.71 Fur-
ther, there was to be no Salary Cap in 1999.72 These two factors meant
that a team could pay a free agent a sizeable signing bonus, but spread
out its impact on the team Salary Cap. It also meant that a team could
arrange a contract so that the salary would be moderate during the
capped years and then balloon in uncapped 1999. There was a way
around the Salary Cap; those who had always drawn top talent still
found a way to land the League's premiere free agent players.
In the offseason between the 1994 and 1995 seasons, after beating the
San Francisco 49ers in the NFC Championship Game two years in a row,
the Dallas Cowboys had gone on to win two consecutive Super Bowls
and take center stage as America's Team. The 49ers of Joe Montana and
Jerry Rice had been known as classy and elegant, the "Team of the 80s";
however, now they were being upstaged by the new decade's team, the
brash Dallas Cowboys. As a result, during this offseason, the 49ers brain
trust of owner Eddie DeBartolo and President Carmen Policy set out to
buy their way back to the top.73 They signed a host of highly-regarded
compensation, payroll, unemployment compensation, social security taxes, per diem
amounts, moving and travel expenses, post-season pay, player medical costs, and sever-
ance pay).
CBA, supra note 66, at art. XXIV, §1 (a)(i)(1) - (2), art. XXIV, §1 (b).
69. The Cap for 1996 is set at $40.8 million. Pro Football- Judge Sets Salary Cap, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at B10. A team does not have to spend up to the Salary Cap, but must
spend at least 50% of its share of Defined Gross Revenues on salaries ("Minimum Team
Salary"). CBA, supra note 66, at art. XXIV, §5.
70. Allen Barra, How the 49ers Beat the Salary Cap, N.Y. TImES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 35.
71. CBA, supra note 66, at art. XXIV §7(b)(i). Signing bonuses are paid up front in one
lump sum.
72. Id at §2.
73. The ultimate credit may go to Mr. Policy's accountant, Dominic Corsell, the team's
resident "capologist." See Barra, supra note 70.
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veteran free agents (including the Cowboys own starting middle line-
backer), lured star Deion Sanders, defeated the Cowboys in the follow-
ing NFC Championship and regained the title of Super Bowl
Champions.'
Not to be outdone, the Cowboys fired back in the 1995-96 season. In
a year in which the Salary Cap was supposed to limit total team spending
to $37.2 million, Cowboys owner Jerry Jones spent more than that just in
signing bonuses ($40 million).75 Jones lured Deion Sanders away from
the 49ers with a $35 million contract ($12 million signing bonus) and
successfully bought back the Super Bowl for the Dallas Cowboys. 76
Consumed with their own escalating rivalry, the "arms race" between
the Cowboys and 49ers only further widened the gap between the NFL's
have and have-nots, completely undermining the intent of the 1993 Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement.77 To these two teams, the devastating ef-
fect of this practice on the rest of the League was a matter of only
secondary concern.
C. The New Way - The Stadium Game
In today's NFL, the currency of competitiveness is cold hard cash.
That is what is required to pay the big signing bonuses which will lure
and secure the free agent talent to field the most competitive team,
boost fan popularity and, thus, maximize revenue. However, in a league
where television, ticket and merchandise revenue are equally split, there
are limited outlets for owners looking to gain the competitive edge on
their colleague competitors (a term that is not an oxymoron in the NFL).
Thus, any outlets that do exist are the objects of relentless pursuit by the
owners - the unshared revenue streams. The paragon of unshared rev-
enue is stadium revenue.
The National Football League shares Gross Receipts and Defined
Gross Revenues (hereinafter "DGR") and exempts from its revenue
sharing plan non-ticket stadium revenue (hereinafter "Excluded DGR").
This policy is set out in both the NFL Constitution and the NFL Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, respectively. They read in pertinent part
"'Gross Receipts', as used in this section, shall mean all receipts derived
from the sale of tickets .. ." and:
74. Id.
75. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
76. Dave Anderson, Jones Successfully Buys NFL Crown, DALLAS MONING Nnws, Jan.
29, 1996, at 4B.
77. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
78. N.F.L. CONsT. art. 19.1 (A)(3) (emphasis added).
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[t]he following shall be considered 'Excluded DGR' and not in-
cluded in Defined Gross Revenues: revenues derived from con-
cessions, parking, local advertising and promotion, signage,
magazine advertising, local sponsorship agreements, stadium
clubs, luxury box income other than that included in subsection1(a)(i)(1) ... 9
In a nutshell, non-ticket luxury box stadium revenue is the principal
exception carved out of revenue sharing and the one honed in on by
revenue-hungry owners. This arrangement has caused owners to explore
and exploit every possible source of non-ticket revenue to generate the
extra cash they zealously pursue.
To best illustrate this point, we turn again to the Dallas Cowboys and
their home, Texas Stadium. When Jerry Jones bought the Cowboys and
Texas Stadium in 1989, he paid what was then the record sum of $140
million.80 Because of both the debt service he incurred and the stadium
revenue he envisioned, Jones quickly turned the facility into a cash cow.
He marketed the team vigorously, signing advertising and sponsorship
agreements and constructing an additional sixty-eight luxury suites.
Luxury suites are like stadium living rooms, providing optimal views of
the action through floor-to-ceiling windows, each equipped with a pri-
vate bar and catering services. 81 Such luxury amenities harness the prof-
itability of sports as entertainment and generate dollars from sources far
above and beyond just the price of admission, all of which are kept ex-
clusively by the home team.
Today, with 280 luxury suites, Texas Stadium generates $37 million in
annual stadium revenues, more than twice as much as the second highest
team and six times the League average - all unshared.8 Because of
this stadium income, the Cowboys are easily the most valuable franchise
in all sports today. The team is currently worth $238 million. 3 The sec-
ond most valuable franchise, the Miami Dolphins, is second in stadium
revenue. Of the top ten most valuable franchises in all of sports, eight
owe their worth to being league leaders in stadium revenue.84 The extra
79. Subsection 1(a)(i)(1) states that Defined Gross Revenues: "includ[es] ticket revenue
from 'luxury boxes', suites and premium seating subject to gate receipt sharing among NFL
teams .. ." CBA, supra note 66, at art. XXIV, §1(a)(3)(iii), art. XXIV, § 1(a)(i)(1) (emphasis
added).
80. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
81. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 17, at 9.
82. Ozanian, supra note 9, at 46-47.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 56.
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revenue generated by their stadium is the main reason why the Cowboys
are the Super Bowl Champions.
Now, Jones's vision is to expand Texas Stadium to 104,000 seats,
make it a dome, build a sports theme park alongside it and add even
more luxury suites.85 There is no question, as Phil Schaaf put it, that
"facility-generated revenues are the new frontier in franchise profit
fulfillment. '8 6
The success of this stadium game has spawned even further revenue-
generating phenomena and not just in Dallas. The League's 1993 expan-
sion saw the advent of Personal Seat Licenses (hereinafter "PSL"), a
new concept in the NFL.' For a new franchise or stadium, PSL's essen-
tially offer fans the chance to become charter member ticketholders by
paying a fee to reserve a seat for a certain number of seasons.as A PSL
is not a ticket itself; it is merely the right to purchase a ticket. But PSL's
have worked brilliantly in raising revenue. In Charlotte, the home of the
new Carolina Panthers, the team raised $150 million for their Ericsson
Stadium through PSLs.89 Fans in St. Louis were so starved after seven
years of football deprivation, that over 74,000 fans bid on their 46,000
PSLs at anywhere from $250-$4,000 each, raising over $70 million to pay
for the Rams move.90 These days, revenue from gate receipts is almost
an afterthought; the focus is on devising and maximizing those revenue
sources other than revenues from the actual ticket.
With the face of sports becoming so stadium-oriented and with teams
increasingly catering to this luxury concept in order to generate revenue,
one writer quipped regarding his vision of the future for a fan at the
ballpark:
You're seated at Yankee Stadium on a sweltering summer Satur-
day afternoon 10 years from now. It is the seventh inning and
you're parched. Time to fight the crowd to get a cold one? No
way. Those days are long gone. Instead, you push a couple of
buttons on the computer screen on the back of the seat in front of
you and order a glass of chilled Chardonnay and a couple of soft-
shell crabs to munch on.91
85. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
86. ScHAAF, supra note 44, at 104.
87. Play Me In St. Louis, supra note 39.
88. Ostfield, supra note 63, at 600.
89. Ray Waddell, Oilers Move to Nashville Heading Toward Reality, AMUSEMENT Bus,
Nov. 6-12, 1995, at 16.
90. Play Me In St. Louis, supra note 39.
91. Michael K. Ozanian, Following the Money: FW's First Annual Report on the Econom-
ics of Sports, FrN. WORLD, Feb. 14, 1995, at 27.
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It is no wonder then that team owners can become so desperate to
land a lucrative stadium deal that they will resort to just about anything
to break their team's existing lease. Ken Bebring, owner of the Seattle
Seahawks, wants out of Seattle so bad that he claims his team must move
because the Kingdome is not an earthquake-safe facility.92 However, of
all the places one might go to avoid an earthquake, Mr. Behring wants to
move his team to Southern California. What Mr. Behring really wants is
to corner the vacated football market in Los Angeles. Nevertheless, in a
comment whose jest is perhaps reflective of the ridiculous extent to
which he feels franchise movements have reached, New England Patriots
owner Robert Kraft's suggestion to the Seahawk's Behring was "Some-
times you've got to take a chance in life . . . The Mariners [Seattle's
baseball team] play 80 games a year there. The Seahawks play, what,
10? That's 30 hours a year. Go ahead, take a chance." 93
D. Cash Quest - The Root Cause of Franchise Free Agency
The stadium game has serious consequences for the NFL. It has un-
dermined the financial equality that revenue sharing was supposed to
provide. Because of this game, the revenue gap between the haves and
have-nots has almost tripled in the last five years, from $12 million to
over $35 million.94 It is this relentless pursuit of unshared revenue
streams that is at the core of today's franchise free agency: this is why
teams move. The Rams moved out of Anaheim because St. Louis built a
$260 million stadium, guaranteed tickets for at least 55,000 of the 70,000
seats would be purchased for every game, paid the Rams $15 million
towards their relocation costs and retired $30 million of debt that the
Rams owed their former city of Anaheim. 95 The Oilers are moving from
Houston because Nashville has offered a $292 million stadium, complete
with 82 luxury suites and 9,600 premium club seats and backed by the
sale of 42,700 PSLs and a promised $28 million relocation fee.96 The
Browns moved out of Cleveland because Baltimore offered a $200 mil-
lion stadium rent-free with 108 luxury boxes and 75,000 club seats and
agreed to give the team all of the revenue from ticket sales, luxury seats,
92. Seismic experts from King County made a presentation to NFL owners pronouncing
the Kingdome as earthquake-safe. Barbara Kingsley, Seahawks' Plan Takes Two Hits, OR-
ANGE Coum-r REG., Mar. 14, 1996, at Dl.
93. Armstrong, supra note 14.
94. Thurow, supra note 10, at A8.
95. ScHA", supra note 44, at 89-90.
96. Heylar, supra note 42, at Al.
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concessions and parking. Finally, the city gave Art Modell $50 million
cash.97
The cash is an interesting part of the deal. Unlike owners who are
out-of-town upstarts, Modell was an institution in Cleveland and part of
the original NFL League Think establishment. Unlike teams such as the
Oilers and Rams, which played in small and unfilled stadiums, the
Browns always packed over 70,000 fans into venerable Cleveland Sta-
dium. It seems that even in these days of stadium sweepstakes, it would
take more than a wad of cash to get Modell to give up his reputation and
this tradition. The cash, therefore, begs an inquiry into just what Mo-
dell's financial situation in Cleveland was, and it also presents a stark
image of what it means to be without a state-of-the-art facility in the era
of superstadiums.
Art Modell's Browns were virtually broke. In the 1970s, he forsook
the chance to move his team out to the suburbs because the city urged
that the departure of the Browns would spell the death of the down-
town.98 In exchange for agreeing to stay, Modell sought and was granted
control of Cleveland Stadium. But the "mistake by the lake" soon be-
came an incessant cash drain, requiring $1 million in annual maintenance
and a total of $18 million in improvements just to sustain it in its margi-
nal state.99 In the mid 1980s, the stadium's other tenant, the Cleveland
Indians, was purchased by Richard Jacobs. Jacobs perhaps saw the fu-
ture because he turned down Modell's offer to contribute to a $130 mil-
lion joint stadium renovation and instead lobbied the city for a new
stadium of his own. After threatening the city that he would otherwise
move, Cleveland responded by building state-of-the-art Jacobs Field, a
baseball only park that generated $21 million in luxury box revenue two
years before it even opened.100
Modell's Browns were still stuck in Cleveland Stadium; he had not so
pressured the city. According to Modell, although he was told his turn
was next, it never quite seemed to come. 10 ' But now, not only did Mo-
97. Schaffer, supra note 21. Myers, supra note 28, at A21.
98. John Helyar, Browns' Blues: In New NFL, Moves Get A Lot of Attention Off the Field
As Well, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1995, at Al, A8.
99. Id.
100. Jacobs Field is part of the Gateway complex, a downtown revival program that also
includes Gund Arena, the home of the city's NBA team, the Cavaliers, as well as the Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame. See id
101. Cleveland contends that it offered Modell the chance to be included in Gateway
(architects concluded that 43,000-seat Jacobs Field could be temporarily expanded to 69,000
seats for football), but that Modell did not want to be a tenant in someone else's stadium.
Modell counters that he was not offered in. See id
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dell not have a lucrative stadium in Cleveland, but someone else did.
The corporate suite patrons of Cleveland Stadium (built in 1931) began
to flee for the glitzy new confines of Jacobs Field and Gund Arena. As a
result, in 1994, the Browns contended a loss of $21 million.10 2 When
Modell tried to bolster the competitiveness of his team by playing the
signing bonus game to lure free agent Andre Rison, unlike Jerry Jones,
Modell had to borrow the money from the bank. He was now $50 mil-
lion in the red, the maximum debt limit allowed by the League,10 3 and
concerned that he would not be able to keep team ownership within his
family unless immediate action was taken.1°4
On November 8, 1995, the City of Cleveland finally approved a $175
million stadium renovation for Modell's Browns. 0 5 But it came too late.
Two days earlier, the agreement Modell signed with Baltimore had al-
ready been made public. The ultimate irony might be that Modell finally
moved the Browns because he had never threatened to move them.
E. Ask the Luxury Box
Franchise free agency has caused League-wide instability since own-
ers threaten to move unless cities ante up what some consider exorbitant
sums of money at a time when there may be more pressing civic needs.
The stadium game has completely skewed traditional notions of whether
or not a team is supported. With unshared luxury box revenue placing
such a premium on the high end of the stadium's ticketholders, the
70,000 fans in the stands may no longer be the relevant measure. It is as
if everyone in a luxury box had four votes and everyone in a standard
seat had one-half. If there are no luxury boxes, then there are very little
votes. Therefore, a team ends up moving because, as dictated by the
new rules of the game, it was not "supported."
When the Raiders originally left Oakland, they had recorded thirteen
consecutive sellout seasons.0 6 However, that did not seem to matter
when Los Angeles offered Al Davis a luxury box package of unshared
revenue amounting to over three times what Oakland could offer.0 7 A
decade-and-a-half later, the principal is the same, but for the factors
mentioned previously, the stakes are that much higher.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Abramowitz, supra note 7, at A19.
105. Officials Reveal Plan to Rescue Browns, TAMPA TmB., Nov. 9,1995, at 10.
106. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 17.
107. $5 million versus $1.3 million. The revenue generated in Los Angeles would be $5
million compared to $1.6 million in Oakland. Id.
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In the NFL, the barometer of success used to be the number of blue
collar fans braving sub-zero temperatures to root for their hometown
gridiron heroes. Today, however, one must knock on the door of each
climate-controlled luxury suite to see how many corporate executives
are spectating the talents of the latest superstar mercenary purchased to
chase the championship that year.
In the current environment, whether out of the sheer desire for profit
or strictly as a means of financial survival in an era of heightened com-
petitiveness, it simply goes against the basic instinct of an owner to op-
pose franchise relocation. And, as always, the threat of relocation
provides the owner with extraordinary leverage in extracting favorable
terms from the team's current home city. The owner wants to-perhaps
the owner has to; these are the new rules of the game. The owner wants
to capture a lucrative stadium deal and supports this pursuit by others in
order to secure support for the day when the owner's team gets an offer
of its own.
V. BROWNS RAMIFICATIONS
"What has been done has been done and has been rectified.
We have received redress."
- Michael White
Mayor, Cleveland'08
On February 9, 1996, a few days before the injunction filed by the
City of Cleveland to keep the Browns from moving was to go to trial in
Cuyahoga County,0 9 the NFL, the City of Cleveland, the State of Mary-
land, Art Modell and the Browns reached an unprecedented agree-
ment.110 Negotiating vigorously between all parties involved, the
League brokered a deal whereby Modell's team was indeed free to leave
for Baltimore, but the name "Browns" and its team colors would remain
108. Richard Sandomir, N.F.L. Gives Modell a Ticket to Baltimore, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 10,
1996, at 33.
109. The city was quite confident that it could win an injunction and keep the Browns in
Cleveland for the duration of their lease until 1998; however, Modell, out of necessity (or
spite), may have then resorted to gutting his team roster of all notable talent in order to pare
down salary costs to the minimum allowed by the NFL (58% of the Salary Cap). This could
have spoiled the atmosphere for football in Cleveland permanently rather than have it be
without a team for the comparatively short period of just three years. Richard Sandomir,
How Compromise Built Cleveland a New Stadium, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 12, 1996, at C4. Will
McDonough, Blocking Scheme Would Sack Modell, B. GLOBE, Dec. 3, 1995, at 97.
110. The vote among the NFL owners was 25-2, with three abstentions. See Athena
Schaffer, NFL Reaches Agreements With Cleveland & Baltimore, AMUSEMENT Bus., Feb. 19,
1996, at 22.
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in Cleveland."' The NFL then pledged to help finance the construction
of a new football stadium in Cleveland within three years and guaran-
teed Cleveland a football team for the 1999 season." 2 Although the
NFL masterfully salvaged an accord before a messy courtroom war was
about to begin, the terms of this agreement portend trouble for the NFL
in the future.113
A. Unworkable Policy Against Owners' Self-Interest
1. Financing
The NFL committed itself to securing money for the construction of
a new stadium and pledged that Cleveland will be provided a new team
to field in it. The loan will be anywhere from $28 million to $48 million
(depending on the final cost estimate of the stadium) and is to be repaid
to the League by the owners of the new Cleveland team." 4 Although
this loan can be neutralized by the $29 million relocation fee Modell will
pay the League, 115 it is odd that the NFL would open itself up to loaning
money for stadium construction. With stadiums becoming the measuring
rod of a franchise's viability, it is not farfetched to imagine a scenario
where any number of owners might argue they too need similar financ-
ing in order to either build or improve a stadium, or to stay fiscally
sound until one is built. For example, the Washington Redskins home,
RFK Stadium, has not one single luxury box. Redskins owner Jack Kent
Cooke could argue that to compete with NFC East division rivals like
the Cowboys, he needs stadium financing to either build luxury boxes or
as compensation for not having them." 6 Even more, an owner could
posture a threat to move as a means of extracting a concession for sta-
dium financing from the League, in exchange for agreeing to stay. Such
investments could actually prove profitable for the NFL since the con-
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue seemed to hint that the relevant test for whether
the NFL would do what it did for Cleveland for another city (were it to lose its team) de-
pended upon whether or not the city came up with a concrete plan to build a new stadium:
"The question is, are people prepared to do what Cleveland has done, to come through with
funding and turn a renovation plan into a new stadium?" Sandomir, supra note 108, at 35.
The City of Cleveland voted on November 8, 1995 to finance a $175 million renovation of
Cleveland Stadium. See Officials Reveal Plan to Rescue Browns, supra note 105.
114., Schaffer, supra note 110.
115. Id.
116. Actually, Jack Kent Cooke is doing something about his not having any luxury boxes
at RFK. He is taking his own money and building a $160 million, 78,600 seat stadium for the
Redskins. See id.
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struction of luxury suites can easily yield exponential returns. Yet, given
the current restlessness among franchises, the NFL could find itself
browbeaten into ultimatums by owners that they will move unless the
NFL facilitates their stay with stadium financing." 7
2. Team Guarantee
The League's guarantee of a team for Cleveland is not in any manner
consistent with owner interests. There are two ways Cleveland can get a
team: either it can take an existing franchise from another city" s or it
can be granted one through expansion. Neither makes sense. If the
NFL openly allows an existing team to move, then it will have given the
de facto go ahead for the continued trend of franchise free agency. If it
selects a team to move, then it will have appeased Cleveland, but at the
expense of alienating another city. Most of all, if it grants Cleveland
expansion, then it will have added another team to the NFL. This last
scenario is particularly curious because it would mean the owners con-
ceded to cutting one additional slice out of their revenue sharing pie.
The owners may be sympathetic to their colleague, Art Modell, but not
at the expense of losing an extra portion of their revenues.
B. Dangerous Precedent
This agreement's contribution to heightening the above possibilities
makes this deal dangerous. The agreement now arguably sets an infor-
mal precedent which opens the door to any number of potentially dis-
turbing situations. The lesson of the Browns deal is that if a suitor city
wants a team, then it should just take one hostage. If the League op-
poses the move, then the suitor city can take the NFL to court and
threaten it with the de rigueur treble damages antitrust suit. Most likely,
the League will not oppose the move in court, leaving only the team's
current city as the lone obstacle to the suitor city's successful hostage-
taking. Luring a team away requires a lucrative stadium package, one
117. In 1995, the NFL did agree to come up with $200 million to finance the construction
of a new stadium in Hollywood Park, California, as a means of providing a new Super Bowl
venue in the state, retaining the Raiders in the Los Angeles area and drawing one new NFC
team back to the Southern California market. Raiders owner AI Davis turned down the deal,
however, and instead returned to Oakland because he did not want to share the stadium with
another football tenant. Steve Springer, Vote is Landslide on Raiders Deal, L.A. TiraNs, May
25, 1995, at C1.
118. However, both the NFL and the City of Cleveland are committed to not taking a
team in breach of its lease, without the consent of the host city. See Tony Grossi, Waiting
Game: NFL's View on Cleveland Centers For Now on Stadium, Not Team, PLAIN DEALER,
Feb. 19, 1996, at 1C.
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which the city is not likely to have been willing or able to come up with
(as that failure is what sends the signal for the city without a team to
strike). Nonetheless, if the city knows that it will otherwise lose its team,
then it may very well pay such ransom, at the expense of other commu-
nity necessities (e.g. education, infrastructure and crime prevention),
buckling to the pressure applied by both the team and the suitor city. If
the city does not pay the ransom, then the team moves and this cuts a
new hole in the franchise fabric. Now, the abandoned city itself may
assume the role of hostage taker and take a team from a third city. Es-
sentially, this is what Baltimore has done by losing a team to Indianapo-
lis and then later taking one from Cleveland. Recently, Nashville took
the Oilers hostage; since Houston did not make a comparable offer, it
will lose its team. In this case, the hostage is actually being taken will-
fully, content to rest its fate with the highest ransom bidder.
Conversely, the city which loses the team can now argue that it is
entitled to receive a replacement franchise from the NFL because the
League gave one to Cleveland. This returns the equation back to the
beginning because now the void can only be filled by either taking an
existing team from yet another city (in which case the chain reaction
continues) or by granting another expansion (further dividing the reve-
nue pie and further drawing the ire of the owners).
The NFL may contend that granting a replacement franchise to
Cleveland was a unique situation because the Browns broke their lease
and the city demonstrated a bona fide commitment to providing a suita-
ble stadium. Although the NFL is not promising Houston a replacement
team, the Rams had also moved before their lease expired and Cleve-
land never declared it would build a new stadium for the Browns until
the team had already left and the NFL agreed to help finance a new
stadium. The creation of a "new stadium test" and others will only exac-
erbate the ambiguity of the NFL's relocation rules because it would now
add to the mix reliance on criteria that do not even exist.119
C. Yet the Jilted Have Been Restored
It cannot go without mention, however, that given the particular dy-
namics of the current array of franchise movements, the Browns agree-
ment may not set off a chain reaction of similar demands from other
119. The relocation rules do not say, for example, that the League will grant a city a new
franchise (or restore one) if the city votes on a new stadium deal within a certain period of
time. Otherwise, Baltimore and St. Louis should have been granted new teams a long time
ago.
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cities that the League is either unwilling or unable to match. This is
because to some degree, the NFL is now whole again. When the Raiders
left Oakland in 1982, the Colts left Baltimore in 1984 and the Cardinals
left St. Louis in 1988, it created holes in three traditional football
franchise cities. However, the Raiders have returned to Oakland, the
Rams have moved to St. Louis and the former Browns have moved to
Baltimore, filling these gaps. With the possible exception of Los Ange-
les, every relocation now is likely to be to a city that has never had a
team before. Since cities with franchises before Raiders have been re-
stored, this may alleviate pressure and return fundamental stability to
the League, despite surface appearances that the situation is still very
fluid.
VI. REFORMS
"We're looked at as selfish. The players are selfish because
they're getting a lot of money, and the owners are selfish because
they're getting a lot of money and they can move any time
they want. That's not the impression that should be there."
- Pat Bowlen
Owner, Denver Broncos' 20
Having the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, it is easy to criticize both the
League and the owners, like a Monday morning quarterback. Some so-
lutions can be offered. If there is a legal problem, then perhaps one
should seek better laws, or at least more of them. As it turns out, re-
sponding to the ire of constituencies whose teams have abandoned them,
members of Congress have already been busy issuing various positions
and proposals on the issue of franchise relocation.
Before sampling the recent and current array of bills that address
team movement, it is first necessary to answer the question of whether
Congress has any business interfering in the individual business affairs of
a private sector game in the first place. After all, if City B makes an
offer for a team superior to that of City A, then it seems reasonable to
argue that the team should naturally go towards the highest bidder -
that is the free market. However, believing that the relationship be-
tween cities and NFL teams is governed by the free market would be far
from the truth. The reason the professional football teams exert such
inordinate leverage over cities today is because the NFL is a monopoly,
a monopoly sanctioned by Congress.
120. Armstrong, supra note 14.
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A. Dr. Frankenstein
The year 1961 has proven to be a watershed year for the NFL at
other junctures of this paper; the same is true here. Returning to the
genesis of League Think, Commissioner Rozelle convinced the owners
of the profitability of submitting to a single shared television contract,
and then had to convince Congress of the propriety of having one."'1 He
succeeded and Congress granted the NFL the authority by passing the
Sports Antitrust Broadcast Act, which exempted the NFL's pooled and
shared television contract from the antitrust laws. The exemption states
that:
The antitrust laws... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or
among persons engaging in or conducting the organized profes-
sional team sports of football.., by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football [games] ... sells or other-
wise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's mem-
ber clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football
122
Then in 1966, Congress again shielded professional football from an-
titrust liability by approving the merger of the NFL with its competitor,
the American Football League (hereinafter "AFL").12 3 This exemption
has been described as perhaps the "critical turning point in the economic
and legal history of professional football in the United States.'12 4
Hence, the NFL as we know it.
The NFL's keen awareness of the hand that feeds it was made clear
in a velvet fist exchange between Commissioner Rozelle and Represen-
tative Hale Boggs (R-LA) during the final stages of the NFL-AFL
merger approval:
"Well, Pete," Boggs offered, "it looks great."
"Great, Hale," Rozelle answered, "that's great."
"Just for the record," Boggs continued, "I assume we can say
the franchise for New Orleans is firm?"
"Well," Rozelle hedged, "it looks good, of course, Hale, but
you know it still has to be approved by the owners. I can't make
any promises on my own."
121. Such a joint agreement would otherwise be a violation of antitrust law under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.
122. 15 U.S.C. §1291 (1986). HARRIS, supra note 2, at 15.
123. See John A. Gray and Stephen J.K. Walters, Is the NFL An Illegal Monopoly, 66 U.
DET. L. REv. 5, 15 (1988).
124. See id.
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Boggs said nothing for a moment, just staring at Rozelle.
"Well, Pete," he finally answered, "why don't you just go back
and check with the owners. I'll hold things up here until you get
back."
Now it was Rozelle's turn to go silent for a moment. "That's
all right, Hale," he finally offered. "You can count on their
approval."'"
B. Happenings on the Hill
Congress is no stranger to regulation of the NFL and to manipulation
of the free market and the antitrust laws on its behalf. This same
penchant for involvement has been evidenced to some degree with re-
spect to franchise free agency as well. In 1985, after the Raiders and
Colts moved, Congress issued numerous bills, including the Professional
Football Stabilization Act, the Professional Sports Franchise Relocation
Act, the Sports Community Protection and Stability Act and, finally, the
Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act.126
In 1995, after the Rams, Raiders (again), and Browns moved, Con-
gress responded by enacting the Fans Rights Act and the Fan Freedom
and Community Protection Act.'27 All of these bills present variations
on the same theme: teams must give proper notice before they can leave
and teams may not leave unless the move survives scrutiny under a set of
factors regarding the market characteristics of the stadium and the city it
departs or is planning to depart. 28 Some support a limited antitrust ex-
emption for the NFL; others do not. A new wrinkle in this decade's
legislation is the provision that even when the players who make up the
human identity of the team leave, the team may be required to leave
behind its symbolic identity: its name, logo and colors.129
One exception to the standard legislation from the Hill is the afore-
mentioned Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act, sponsored by
Representative Martin Hoke (R-OH).3 ° Unlike the majority of its leg-
islative counterparts, this Act moves beyond proclamations of how
things in a vacuum ought to be and makes a quality effort to propose
125. HARRIs, supra note 2, at 17.
126. See Daniel S. York, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act Congress'
Best Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 345, 358-366 (1987).
127. S. 1439, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), H.R. 2740, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
128. See id.
129. Then again, as Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, "[w]e live by symbols." See Mi-
nersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940).
130. S. 1439, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), H.R. 2740, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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policy anchored in the realities of this marketplace. The Act under-
stands that the NFL's power flows from the fact that it is a Congress-
ionally-sanctioned monopoly and it thus gains its leverage by proposing
to condition the NFL's television broadcast antitrust exemption on ac-
ceptance of the Act's provisions. 31 If a team moves, then once the
abandoned city finds a "qualified investor," the League must grant that
city an expansion team within twelve months. 32 The central thrust of
the Act is to shift control away from the NFL by placing power over
expansion in the hands of the city.' 33
C. Self-Regulation - Reform Revenue Sharing
The best way to solve the problems of the professional football busi-
ness is within the structure of the NFL's team owners. Rather than
shackle the NFL with government mandates or write in more exemp-
tions to further skew the marketplace, the most viable reforms are those
that the League and owners impose upon themselves because they find it
consistent with their economic interests. This can be accomplished in a
manner that will still narrow the bargaining gap between cities and
teams, currently tilted completely in the latter's favor.
1. Link What You Keep With What You Share
As presented earlier, the major exception to the NFL's comprehen-
sive revenue sharing system is non-ticket stadium revenue. 34 This is
revenue principally derived from sources such as club seats, corporate
suites and PSLs-the playing field of today's business of professional
football. As the record shows, the owners have declined to include these
monies as part of the revenue divided equally and there is no realistic
expectation that they will alter this situation purely out of altruism. 35 If
the cost of hoarding stadium revenue exceeds the benefit, then owners
will change their thinking. Taking a step back and looking at the big
picture of the recent franchise relocations illustrates this point. By mov-
131. See H.R. 2740, §2(7).
132. A "qualified investor" is one who can put into escrow at least 85% of the franchise
fee charged by the League for the last expansion team and who can put into escrow an amount
equal to the price of the last professional sports team approved by the League. Id. at §5.
133. At this writing, the Act has 50 Co-sponsors, has been passed 24-6 by the House
Judiciary Committee and is being sent to the House floor (information obtained from the
Office of Representative Martin Hoke).
134. See supra notes 80-81, and accompanying text.
135. Owners voted on a Collective Bargaining Agreement (which includes the revenue
sharing provisions) just three years ago (1993).
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ing from Los Angeles to St. Louis, from Los Angeles to Oakland and
from Cleveland to Baltimore, the Rams, Raiders and Browns, respec-
tively, have all left large television markets for smaller ones. 36 In each
case, the move has been in the interest of the individual owner because
the benefit of a lush new stadium deal far outweighed the cost of dimin-
ishing the owner's one-thirtieth portion of shared television revenue. In
essence it is like a free-rider problem; any one team has great incentive
to bolt towards its exclusive stadium bonanza because the consequent
potential decline in its other revenue is cushioned by fragmenting the
loss across the League's twenty-nine other members.
This trend may naturally blow up in the NFL's collective face if the
sum total broadcast rights fee in its next television contract disappoint-
edly reflects this loss of major television markets. But prior to this oc-
currence, the NFL can stop this team-by-team trend by requiring a
moving team to reimburse the League for the difference in television
revenue caused by its desertion of the larger television market.
Although not necessarily a perfect cure-all, once the surge in stadium
revenue is offset by making the team responsible for the drop the move
can cause in television revenue, the team will think harder about just
how appealing the move actually is. Further, by making the team ac-
countable for the consequences its move has on the shared television
contract, League Think will be reinforced. Finally, since stadium reve-
nue is now offset, this effectively reduces the incentive to offer the lucra-
tive stadium deals, lowering the bar back down to where a city trying to
keep a team can more reasonably do so.
Although this might be criticized in the abstract as addressing the
issue only when team flow is from a large to a smaller market, the reality
is that the trend of franchise free agency has proven to be one of sta-
dium-rich smaller market cities raiding cash-broke large ones.
D. True Colors - A Proposal for Real Change
Although Congress has been quick to hold hearings and send bills to
the floor every time teams start moving around, it should be noted that
none of these bills has become law.137 Since the overriding problem
these bills purport to remedy has continued, Congress's short attention
136. Helyar, supra note 42. The Rams left the second largest television market in Los
Angeles, for the twentieth ranked market in St. Louis. The Raiders left the second largest
television market in Los Angeles to play in the fifth ranked market in Oakland. The Brovns
left the thirteenth largest television market in Cleveland for the twenty-third ranked market in
Baltimore.
137. SHRmopsimn, supra note 17, at 60.
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span begs the question of whether its motivation has been only political.
Conversely, the record has shown that although the League waxes poetic
about its concern for fans, behind closed doors the owners have taken
the money and run (or let others run). If Congress and the NFL and its
owners are serious about solving the problem of franchise free agency,
they should neutralize venue, redefine ownership and incentivize
expansion.
1. Neutralize Venue
A major obstacle of receiving an objective hearing on the antitrust
merits of the NFL's rules for franchise relocation is the question of
venue. As established earlier, although the residents of a city that is
either losing or expecting a team are perhaps the most relevant inter-
ested parties, adjudication before a "home-town 138 jury will by its very
nature always tilt the scales against the League.139 Therefore, to appro-
priately decide these matters, Congress should adopt a Sports Franchise
Arbitration Board140 (hereinafter "Board"), similar to the one proposed
in Senator Gorton's Professional Sports Team Community Protection
Act.'4 ' This Board shall consist of one randomly-selected representative
of the Sports Authority of two NFL cities not involved in the relocation,
as well as the President or representative of the American Arbitration
Association. 42 When a move is proposed, the Board shall hear
presentations from the League, the team, and the two cities.' 43 The leg-
islation would stipulate that all moves require such hearing and that the
decision whether or not to approve a move would rest with the Board's
conclusion regarding the arguments heard. 44
Although some questions remain unanswered here, those details can
be worked out. The principle still remains that this approach will go a
long way towards mitigating the problem of subjective venue. Even
though potentially perceived as a loss of control over internal League
138. See Commissioner, supra note 11, at 9.
139. In this instance, the cities do not offset one another, the NFL just ends up losing
twice.
140. Senator Gorton's Board seems predisposed to denying relocations since its provision
is written in as part of a bill that would prohibit transfers unless the League and the Board
determine that the move is "necessary and appropriate." See York, supra note 126, at 358-66.
141. Id
142. IM
143. Id.
144. If a team that the Board refused to grant permission to move tried to then minimize
costs in its current city by slashing its payroll etc., then the NFL could address this matter
through its criteria for maintaining membership eligibility in the League.
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matters, 145 the NFL should welcome such a Board authority because it
will enable a relocation matter to be decided more objectively on the
merits and not on emotion or political posturing.
2. Redefine Ownership
In today's era of superstadiums, the general assumption is that a
team owner can only be a multimillion-dollar tycoon who invariably
leaps towards the next best revenue opportunity. But what if there were
a way, even with the existing high barriers to entry, to change the team
owners' motivation away from maximization of profit and towards max-
imization of loyalty to the community? There is a way; change the na-
ture of ownership. The worth of an owner may not be as great if the
ownership can be spread out and divided among enough people. Also,
by dividing authority, the team's future will be insured against the whim
of just one owner. This is the story of the Green Bay Packers.
The Green Bay Packers have a unique ownership structure. The
team is actually a non-profit corporation, publicly owned by 1,898 share-
holders and managed by a 45-member unpaid board of directors. 146 The
owners receive no dividends and the team shares are worth exactly the
same value as when they were issued 46 years ago.147 Since the Packer
owners do not profit from the team, they have no incentive to listen to
offers from suitor cities. As a result, the Packers do not move. As the
team treasurer succinctly stated, "we just have a different perspec-
tive."" The shareholders can transfer the shares, which eventually end
up going to children and grandchildren.149
Critics might contend that anomalous Green Bay is only able to exist
because it feeds off the work of teams in the real revenue-driving mar-
kets in Dallas, San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Washington. But
that is exactly why the NFL has such comprehensive revenue sharing to
begin with, so that small market teams can co-exist with their big market
brethren. It is true that the Packers may not be able to generate revenue
145. Under this proposal, the owners' vote would not be the deciding factor. Neverthe-
less, 1) it hardly is under the present system and 2) owners can still vote for the record. Also,
they, through the Office of the NFL Commissioner, would be entitled to make presentations
before the Board, whose recommendations would certainly weigh on the Board's final
decision.
146. Richard Sandomir, America's Small-Town Team Packers Play for Touchdown, Not
for Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1996, at 35. Helen Huntley, Packers: One Team, 1,898 Own-
ers, ST. PETERSBURG TnMEs, Jan. 14, 1996, at 1H.
147. Id.
148. Huntley, supra note 146.
149. Id.
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and compete for top-notch talent on the level of Jerry Jones's Cowboys.
Nevertheless, even in the days of salary "cap"onomics, the NFL's
equally-shared television revenue provides a financial base with which
any team can reasonably compete so long as the stadium, although not a
cash generator, is at least not a cash drain. This is ostensibly the beauty
of League Think.
Actually, Green Bay is not doing too badly. In 1995, all of its games
were sold out, it was in the black ($2 million net income) and it even had
enough money to build 90 luxury boxes in its stadium, Lambeau Field.
Although the Packers also benefit from favorable lease terms where the
team gets all ticket, concession and parking revenue, one can hardly call
such an agreement exploitative when it is imposed upon the community,
by the community. 150
Absent Green Bay's grandfather clause, the NFL actually prohibits
such non-profit forms of ownership.' 5' Is this because the League pre-
fers to be a millionaire's club disposed to gouging cities? If the NFL
resents this pejorative characterization and truly cares about its fans,
then let it vote to change the ownership rule. Otherwise, Congress
should require that in exchange for its television contract antitrust ex-
emption, the NFL shall allow for a team to be owned by a public corpo-
ration so long as the Sports Franchise Arbitration Board finds that it
meets requisite tests of financial viability.'52
A disparate ownership group will be able to take cohesive action if
the ownership is managed by the respective city's Sports or Stadium Au-
thority; virtually every city serious about sports already has one. Addi-
tionally, even a number of owner fans could be randomly selected to
serve terms on the governing authority, ensuring that it is sufficiently
representative of all interests. The point is not to get consumed in the
details of who has the power because, by granting ownership to the peo-
ple at large, the psyche of ownership will no longer be motivated by the
priority of power.
Since it is certain that a team is due in Cleveland, a movement to-
wards public ownership should be spearheaded there by its sharp mayor,
150. Sandomir, supra note 146.
151. The prohibition and Packers exemption read in pertinent part: "No corporation, as-
sociation, partnership or other entity not operated for profit nor any charitable organization
or entity not presently a member of the League shall be eligible for membership." N.F.L.
CONsT. art. 3.2(a).
152. Such tests could begin with the factors enumerated in the Fan Freedom and Commu-
nity Protection Act that constitute a "qualified investor." See supra note 132, and accompany-
ing text.
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Michael White. If approved in a referendum, let the people of Cleve-
land give birth to the new Browns.
3. Incentivize Expansion
Of course, merely one change in ownership will not solve, the under-
lying problem of overall team shortage. Ultimately, the only way to cure
the epidemic of franchise free agency is to demolish the NFL's monopo-
listic structure. By opening the League's floodgates, the supply will rise
to the level of demand and the vast inequities between the water levels
of teams and cities will finally balance out. Owners typically argue that
too many teams will cause a shortage of true talent, reducing the quality
of play and causing a decline in fan interest. Not only is the argument
for a Domino Effect hypothetical, this concern (although perhaps under-
standable in an individual or non-contact sport) is mitigated by the fact
that professional football is a full-contact team sport where quality
quickly becomes a factor that is largely relative. Finally, a decline in
quality does not necessarily cause the sport's popularity to suffer. This is
especially true considering that there is a surplus of cities that want
teams, and fans even in cities that do have teams can often not see
games, as the stadiums are sold to capacity.153
Forcing the League to expand would be considered draconian by
even the NFL's most ardent critics. Rather, the most effective and equi-
table solution is to peg expansion to the NFL's lifeblood, its network
television contract. Unless the NFL voluntarily proposes such a scheme,
Congress should require that, as a condition of the Sports Antitrust
Broadcast Act, two teams be added for every certain percentage or dol-
lar amount increase in the sum of the NFL's negotiated network televi-
sion contract. 5 4 As the pie gets larger, the more it can be shared.
Although an argument could be made that the current group of owners
153. See JoHNsoN, supra note 34, at 239.
154. Representative Hoke's bill proposes to force expansion by linking such a require-
ment to the television broadcast exemption, but it does not provide for any such trigger that
will provide the owners with any incentive to expand. An analysis would certainly have to be
conducted in a manner that calculates when the television revenue fee increases to the next
level such that there is room for further slicing of the revenue pie, but in a way such that the
existing teams still see their portion of shared revenues increase in a reasonable amount. For
starters, it would have to operate on a sliding scale such that the percentage increase change is
less as the total dollar amount increases. Nevertheless, such a system is not alien to the NFL;
it already engages in a similar procedure when New York Federal District Court Judge David
Doty listens to presentations from the NFL and NFLPA and orders the new Salary Cap
amount for the upcoming year (which is pegged at a fixed percentage of the League's gross
revenues [the percentage decreases as the revenue increases]). See Pro FootbalLk Judge Sets
Salary Cap, supra note 69.
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might then choose to freeze the contract at a certain level in order to
close ranks, this is unrealistic because the League will be beholden to the
offers that the third party network bidders make. Further, since annual
League-wide television revenue is currently topping the $1 billion mark,
owners are likely to find it a good deal to slice out an extra $100 million
or so every few years if it enables them to chase the next billion and
beyond.
In the alternative, or even in concert, a team should be added within
two years of receipt by the Sports Franchise Arbitration Board of a com-
prehensive proposal from an ownership group of a city seeking a team.
The proposal shall have to be approved by the Sports Franchise Arbitra-
tion Board and make an offer worth at least 110% the value of the last
such proposal approved by the Sports Franchise Arbitration Board.155
If the new economics of the NFL are recognized and appreciated,
rather than ignored or resented, then these same market drivers can also
be creatively utilized to solve the very challenges they have wrought.
VII. THE FuTutm
"I see great things for the NFL in the future."
- Jerry Jones
Owner, Dallas Cowboys' 15 6
A. You Own the What?
The NFL's 1984 franchise relocation procedures did not contemplate
that owners of teams would also be the owners of the stadiums where
their teams played.157 However, cross-ownership and its potential for
profitable synergy is an emerging trend that is at the core of the NFL's
new economics. Today, the two most valuable teams in the NFL (and
indeed in all of sports) are the Dallas Cowboys and Miami Dolphins, two
of the three NFL teams whose owners also own their team's stadiums.
The only other city where the team and stadium share the same owner is
New England, where Robert Kraft owns both the Patriots and Foxboro
155. The proposal could also be evaluated against the last such proposal approved by the
League, if it is the first or second such proposal presented before the Board. The percentage
worth of the proposal can be pegged on a sliding scale such that it increases as more time
elapses between the current proposal and the most recent previous one.
156. Bob Glauber, Shifty Business: NFL Scramble to Keep Up With Controversial Jerry
Jones, NEWSDAY, Nov. 12, 1995, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
157. The rules assume that a team negotiate with a separate "stadium authority" (which is
presumably the owner of the facility). Procedures, supra note 48, at B(3).
158. Ozanian, supra note 9, at 50.
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Stadium.'59 Currently, unlike his Dallas and Miami counterparts, Kraft's
stadium does not generate large unshared revenue streams (he is cur-
rently in negotiation to have a state-of-the-art facility built in Boston).
Like Jerry Jones, Kraft is in the vanguard of the NFL, testing the param-
eters of the League's institutional framework by signing stadium spon-
sorship agreements with companies and brands other than those with
which the NFL has signed its teams to exclusive agreements with.160
B. Every Logo For Himself
The NFL is currently in litigation against the Dallas Cowboys regard-
ing the fate of stadium sponsorship agreements because Jerry Jones has
skirted the NFL's exclusive sponsorship agreements with Reebok, Visa
and Coca Cola by signing up Nike, American Express, Pepsi and Dr.
Pepper to serve Texas Stadium and provide Cowboys coaches with side-
line apparel. The NFL contends that under an agreement effective until
2004, all teams have consented to revenue-share the sale of their mer-
chandise by licensing the use of their team names and logos only through
the League's marketing arm, NFL Properties. 161
But Jerry Jones counters 62 that he should not be forced to equally
share the revenue fruit of his efforts when the Cowboys account for 30%
of all merchandising revenue, double that of even the second most popu-
lar team.163 Critics are quick to remind Jones, however, that six years
ago, when the Cowboys were not Super Bowl Champions (they finished
the 1989 season 1-15) and when they were not popular (they accounted
for only two percent of all merchandising in 1990), he still gleefully ac-
cepted an equal portion of the League's shared television revenue.' 64
The League dynamics have changed dramatically since 1989 and Jones
159. Timothy Smith, Tagliabue Plans to Take Jones to Task, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at
B15.
160. Id.
161. Richard Sandomir, Dollars and Dallas: League of Their Own, N.Y. Tims, Sept. 24,
1995, at 3-1.
162. The Cowboys, Texas Stadium, Jones and other entities related to the Cowboys have
filed a $ 750 million suit against NFL Trust and NFL Properties. Plaintiff's Brief, Dallas Cow-
boys, Ltd. v. National Football League Trust, filed in S.D.N.Y. (1995) [hereinafter Cowboys].
Judge Rules Against Dallas, N.Y. Tims, Feb. 21, 1996, at B12.
163. Two solutions could be 1) that each team be guaranteed to receive a minimum pay-
ment, but that those who make sales far in excess of their 1/30th share be entitled to bonus
payments, and 2) that teams be allowed to solicit sponsorships in areas not currently pursued
by NFL Properties. See Sandomir, supra note 161.
164. Id.
1996]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
may actually appreciate the reminder because his next target may very
well be some form of television.
The area of merchandising revenue provides the NFL with the appro-
priate opportunity to explore individual team entrepreneurialism and to
do so essentially risk-free. 165 It is appropriate because, unlike national
television revenue, which is generated by the appeal of two teams play-
ing against each other (even when viewers may be primarily tuned in just
to watch one of them), this merchandising revenue is dependent exclu-
sively on the attractiveness of the one respective team. It is largely risk-
free because although licensing revenue has jumped an astounding 400%
since 1988,166 it still accounts for an average of only 5% of each team's
slice of the revenue sharing pie, a minuscule amount when compared to
television (63%) and gate receipts (31%).167 As a result, the recommen-
dation is that the NFL vote to release the logos from the NFL Trust and
authorize licensing activities back to the teams, giving the teams the full
incentive to vigorously market themselves.
Legally, Jones's position regarding merchandising is that his sponsor-
ship agreements are not subject to NFL control because, technically,
they are agreements made not with the team, but by... the stadium.168
Welcome to the outer limits of the NFL's new economics. It is testing
the very institutional framework of the League.
C. Whither League Think
The NFL claims that it is a single sports league, but the inescapable
fact is that this League is made up of no more than the extent of the
voluntary collective will of its individual owners.' 9 Owners have clearly
165. The only caveat to this contention is that the current arrangement is structured to set
aside some of the money from NFL Properties to the players, as part of Defined Gross Reve-
nues used to formulate the Salary Cap in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. See Smith,
supra note 159.
166. Sandomir, supra note 161.
167. Typically, a team in 1995 would have received $40 million in television revenue, $20
million in gate receipts and $3.5 million in licensing revenue. See Richard Aim Jones vs. the
NFL, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1995, at 1D.
168. The Cowboys position is that it is Texas Stadium that entered into these transactions,
not the team per se. The team's position that these transactions operate at arm's length from
the Cowboys, however, is undermined by the fact that the $40 million Pepsi paid for pouring
rights at Texas Stadium contributed to the Cowboys ability to offer and pay the $37 million
contract to Deion Sanders, particularly his $12 million, up-front signing bonus. See Cowboys,
supra note 162, at 44-47. See Ray Waddell, Cowboys Rewriting NFL Revenue Rules, AMUSE-
MENT Bus., Sept. 18-24, 1995, at 1, 36.
169. See John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owners, Cities, Leagues and Con-
gress, 5 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 83, 90 (1995).
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demonstrated through their self-serving actions that, beyond just on-the-
field competition, they consider themselves to also be business competi-
tors of one another, undermining the cooperative notion of a league. If
this is not the case, then the NFL should expeditiously correct the glar-
ing inequities in its revenue sharing system and restore stability and
overall competitive balance to the League. Either way, the time has
come for the owners of the NFL to decide what they are going to do:
either make amends for the new economic factors which govern the
game or stop pretending to believe in League Think.

